Wechsler v. Wechsler Appellant\u27s Reply Brief Dckt. 44297 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
2-22-2017
Wechsler v. Wechsler Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt.
44297
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For
more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Wechsler v. Wechsler Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 44297" (2017). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All. 6469.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6469
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
SHARON WECHSLER, 
V. 
NORMAN J. WECHSLER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. CV-2015-0862-0C 
Docket No. 44297-2016 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District 
of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock 
Honorable David C. Nye, District Judge 
Bannock County Case CV-2015-0862-0C 
Bron Rammell (ISB#: 4389) 
Jason Brown (ISB#: 8758) , 
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD. 
P.O. Box 370 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0370 
Telephone: (208) 233-0132 
Fax: (208) 234-2961 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
Stephen J. Muhonen 
RACINE, OLSEN, NYE, BUDGE 
& BAILEY, CHTD. 
P.O. Box 1391 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Telephone: (208) 232-6101 
Fax: (208) 232-6109 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 
FEB 2 2 2017 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
......... ARGUMENT 111. 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
COMPELLING APPELLANT 
1. Issue Was Raised in the District Court 
2. Appellee Misunderstands the Rules and 
Argument 
3. A Debtor's Exam is Not a Deposition 
4. Appellee Failed to Meet and Confer Pursuant 
to LR. C.P. 3 7 
5. Appellant Was Never Provided a Notice of 
Deposition 
6. Subpoenas 
B. APPOINTMENT OF THE ANCILLARY 
RECEIVER WAS IMPROPER 
1. Authority Argument Was Raised in the Court 
Below 
2. Code Does Not Address Appointment of 
Ancillary Receiver 
3. False Claim by Appellee 
Page(s} 
................................. 1 
................................. 2 
.. ............................... 2 
.. ............................... 2 
.... "." " .... " .. "." ......... 2 
.. ............................... 3 
.. ............................... 6 
.. ............................... 7 
.. ............................... 8 
.. ............................... 9 
............................... 10 
............................... 10 
.. ............................. 11 
.. ............................. 14 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (con't) 
Page(s) 
C. APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS ............................... 15 
WERE VIOLATED 
1. Constitutional Issues Were Raised in the Court ............................... 15 
Beiow 
2. This Court Can Consider Constitutional Issues . .............................. 15 
Raised on Appeal 
3. Appellant's Fourth and Fourteenth . .............................. 17 
Amendment Rights Apply 
4. Appellant's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment . .............................. 20 
Rights to Due Process Were Violated 
5. Appellant's First and Fourteenth Amendment . .............................. 22 
Rights Were Violated 
6. District Court Should Have Granted Attorney . .............................. 23 
Fees 
7. Motions to Strike Were Improperly Denied by . .............................. 23 
the District Court 
8. A Conflict of Interest Exists in an Officer of . .............................. 24 
the Court Being Compensated by Appellee, 
and Being Represented by Her Counsel 
9. Attorney Fees on Appeal ............................... 25 
IV. CONCLUSION . .............................. 26 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page(s) 
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 (1972) ........................... 21, 22 
In re Bodeker, No. 12-60137-7, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2336, ............................... 18 
at *46 (U.S. Bankr. D. Mont. June 7, 2013) 
In re Kerlo, 311 B.R. 256, 263 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2004) ........................... 18, 20 
Messmer v. Ker, 96 Idaho 75, 78,524 P.2d 536,539 ............................... 16 
(1974) 
Murray v. Spalding, 141 Idaho 99, 101-02, 106 P.3d 425, ............................... 16 
427-28 (2005) 
Ransom v. Topaz, 143 Idaho 641,644, 152 P.3d 2, 5 ................................. 2 
(2006) 
Sanchez v. Arave, 120 Idaho 321,322, 815 P.2d. 1061, ............................... 15 
1062 (1991) 
State v. Demint, 384 P.3d 995, 997 (Ct. App. 2016) ............................ 2, 10 
United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1982) ........................... 17, 18 
111 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (con't) 
Statutes 
Idaho Appellate Rule 41 
Idaho Code §1-205 
Idaho Code §8-601 
Idaho Code §8-604 
Idaho Code §8-605 
Idaho Code §11-501 
Idaho Code §11-502 
Idaho Code §11-508 
Idaho Code §12-121 
Idaho Code §55-1003 
Idaho Code §55-1008 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 2.3(b) 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 30 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 3 7 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 45 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 46 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, Rule 69 
28 USC. §151 
The Examiner, Jonathan Swift (1710) 
IV 
Page(s} 
............................... 25 
.......... ··············· ...... 16 
............................... 12 
............................... 14 
............................... 18 
..................... 3, 4, 5, 7, 9 
.............................. 7, 9 
···························· ..... 4 
............................... 25 
............................... 19 
............................... 19 
............................... 20 
............................... 22 
................................. 6 
................................. 7 
................................. 9 
............................ 2, 11 
.............................. 3, 4 
............................... 18 
................................. 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"Falsehood flies, and the Truth comes limping after it." The Examiner, Jonathan Swift 
(1710). In the Statement of the Case section of Respondent's Brief, she supplies statements of 
opinion and conjecture not supported by the record or the law. She continues to try to reform the 
facts into the shape she desires. When Appellant left New York after the divorce, he moved to the 
Colorado home he was awarded in the divorce. He lived there for an eleven-year period during 
which Appellee did not appear to be "looking under rocks," or "chasing" him, and he had definitely 
not "fallen off the map." Respondent's Brief, Statement of Facts, A. Nature of the Case, p. I. In 
2012, Appellee bought the home in a Sheriff's sale and evicted Appellant. Respondent's Brief, 
Statement of Facts, A. Nature of the Case, p. 1. He now resides in a modest home in Pocatello, has 
a roommate who pays rent, and they share food and utility expenses. Plaintiff's depiction of Mr. 
Wechsler as someone who is hiding money and/or assets is incorrect and unsupported by the facts. 
Appellee stated on page 9 of her Brief that "On June 8, 2016, Creditor filed an Ex Parte 
Motion for Writ of Assistance. R., 6/8/2016 p. 5." The citation used by Appellee is to the ROA 
report in the court record. Even there, it is clear that no document titled Ex Parte Motion for Writ 
of Assistance was ever filed by Appellee. The entry cited, R., 6/8/2016 p. 5, states that an 
Application for Writ of Assistance was filed on the day specified by Appellee in her Brief 
Respondent's Brief, p. 9. The actual document is not found in the record. 
For the convenience of the Court, Appellant addresses the issues raised in Respondent's 
Brief herein in the order in which she presented them. All points and arguments presented in 
Appellant's Brief are incorporated as if included in their entirety. 
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for questions of law is one of free review. Ransom v. Topaz, 14 3 
Idaho 641, 644, 152 P.3d 2, 5 (2006). The other standards of review offered by Appellee are 
inapplicable to this case. The recognition of the foreign judgments in this case has not been 
appeaied. No discovery request was ever served on Appellant in the case below, and no discovery 
process was ever employed by Appellee, thus the standard of review for discovery is irrelevant as 
well. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN COMPELLING APPELLANT 
I. Issue Was Raised in the District Court 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that "For an objection to be preserved for appellate 
review, either the specific ground for the objection must be clearly stated or the basis of the 
objection must be apparent from the context." State v. Demint, 384 P.3d 995, 997 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2016). Appellee acknowledged in her Brief that Appellant stated his objection in the court below 
at Reporter's Transcript on Appeal, 04-25-16, p. 25, 11. 14-17. Respondent's Brief, p. 15. The issue 
was therefore clearly stated in the court below as required. Appellee's argument that because the 
issue was not briefed it has not been raised is not supported by law or fact. If Appellee's argument 
were correct, oral objections in any district court would be of no avail, and any party who had not 
briefed an issue, even having raised a proper objection in the district court, would be prohibited 
from raising the objection on appeal. This position leads to an absurd result. Rule 46 of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure states in pertinent part that "A formal exception to a ruling or order is 
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unnecessary. When the ruling or order is requested or made, a party need only state the action that 
it wants the court to take or objects to, along with the grounds for the request or objection." 
(Emphasis added). Appellant raised the objection in argument before the District Court. He stated 
grounds for his objection which were that there was no meet and confer, which is required prior to 
the filing of a motion to compei, and that there was no action pending to which a motion to compel 
would pertain. The objection was raised in court proceedings below as required by Rule 46, 
therefore it is not a new issue and this claim should survive. 
2. Appellee Misunderstands the Rules and Argument 
It is clear to no one but Appellee that a debtor's exam is part of the discovery process. The 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and Idaho Code do not line up with this assertion. The law and the 
facts of this case support the position that Appellee never began the discovery process, and that 
she should not be able to now use it against Appellant. 
Idaho Code §11-501 states that if a judgment "is returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, 
the judgment creditor, at any time after such return is made, is entitled to an order from the judge 
of the Court requiring such judgment debtor to appear and answer upon oath concerning his 
property." (Emphasis added). The Order for Debtor's Exam (R., p. 38-39) and Amended Order 
for Debtor's Exam (R., p. 42-43) similarly limited the scope of inquiry in the debtor's exam. It 
instructed Appellant to "answer questions concerning assets owned by Defendant or obligations 
owed by a third party to Defendant." Appellant answered these questions. 
No reference to a debtor's exam, or any type of enforcement thereof, is found in Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 69, which Appellee attempts to use to tie the debtor's exam to the 
3 
rules. This rule provides guidance for plaintiffs at the execution stage oflitigation. Part (a) of Rule 
69 contains instructions for law enforcement and court personnel. Part (b) of Rule 69 is a statement 
of applicability of Idaho Code and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to execution proceedings. 
It states that "The procedure on execution, in proceedings supplementary to and in aid of judgment, 
and in proceedings on and in aid of execution must be in accordance with the statutes of the state 
of Idaho and as provided in these rules." JR.C.P. Rule 69. The statutes of the state of Idaho, 
specifically Idaho Code 11-501, grant the authority to a creditor to conduct a debtor's exam. Idaho 
Code 11-508 specifies the consequence for disobedience to that authority, "If any person, party or 
witness disobey an order of the referee properly made in the proceedings before him under this 
chapter, he may be punished by the court or judge ordering the reference, for a contempt." Idaho 
t. 
Code §11-508. There is no provision for a motion to compel in Title 5, Chapter 11. Part (c) of Rule 
69 states "In aid of the judgment or execution, the judgment creditor or successor in interest whose 
interest appears of record may obtain discovery from any person, including the judgment debtor, 
as provided in these rules and may examine any person, including the judgment debtor, in the 
manner provided by these rules." JR.C.P. Rule 69. The creditor "may obtain discovery from any 
person, including the judgment debtor, as provided in these rules and may examine any person, 
including the judgment debtor, in the manner provided" by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
JR.C.P. Rule 69. Appellee continues to profess reliance on the rules, but still has made no proper 
use of them. No discovery request was ever made pursuant to Rule 26, and no notice for a 
deposition was ever received by Appellant's attorney. 
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Additionally, Idaho Code §11-501 states that the creditor "is entitled to an order from the 
judge of the court requiring such judgment debtor to appear and answer upon oath concerning his 
property." Only the debtor can be required to appear for a debtor's exam. Part (c) of Rule 69 allows 
the creditor in aid of execution to "obtain discovery from any person, including the judgment 
debtor, as provided in these rules," and to "examine any person, including the judgment debtor, in 
the manner provided by these rules." JR.C.P. Rule 69(c). Rule 69(c) allows a creditor to demand 
discovery or testimony from any person. These rules when placed side by side contradict each 
other. The difference in parties who may be summoned alone demonstrates the fallacy of 
Appellee's argument that a debtor's exam is governed by Rule 69. The rules pertaining to debtor's 
examinations are contained in Idaho Code Title 5, Chapter 11, and the rules of discovery do not 
apply thereto. Discovery rules do apply to JR.C.P. 69, but Appellee did not avail herself of that 
rule in the proceedings below. Appellee's claim that "There is no other direction in the Idaho Rules 
of Civil Procedure regarding a debtor examination other than what is in Rule 69," is correct. 
Appellee frequently refers to the debtor's exam as a "Rule 69 debtor's exam." Respondent's Brief, 
p. 16, 17, 21. The Rule 69 language regarding examination of a debtor, or any other person, does 
not refer to a debtor's exam but to a deposition and discovery process, which Appellee never 
utilized in this case. As this phrase could mislead the Court, Appellant moves the Court to disregard 
all of the improper references to a "Rule 69 debtor's exam" contained in Appellee's pleadings. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 16. The reason that there are no other references to a debtor's exam in the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure is that debtor's exams are governed by Idaho Code Title 5, Chapter 
11, and all direction as to conduct of that proceeding is contained therein. The reference to being 
5 
able to examine a debtor in aid of execution in Rule 69(c) is wholly separate and distinct. As a 
result, Appellee' s claim fails and the judgment of the District Court should be reversed and 
remanded with instruction. 
3. A Debtor's Exam is Not a Deposition 
Appeilant never admitted that a debtor's exam is a deposition. Respondent's Brief, p. 17, 
39. Appellee misunderstands the meaning of the quoted passage from Appellant's Opening Brief, 
p. 9. Appellant does not concede or admit any such thing. The misunderstood quote is found on 
page 9 of Appellant's Opening Brief and states, "I.R.C.P. 69 explicitly allows for examination of 
the judgment debtor. This process is generally referred to as a deposition, and is governed by 
I.R.C.P. 30. No notice of deposition has ever been served on Appellant." Appellant's Opening 
Brief, p. 9. There is no reference of any kind to a debtor's exam in this passage. It states that 
Appellee could have conducted a deposition of Appellant pursuant to IR.CP. Rules 69 and 30 but 
that she chose not to. She employed none of the discovery devices available to her, yet she asked 
the District Court to punish Appellant for non-compliance with discovery rules. The District Court 
erred in doing so. All assertions by Appellee that Appellant acknowledged that a debtor's exam is 
a deposition are incorrect and should be disregarded by this Court. 
Because debtor's exams are governed by Idaho Code Title 5, Chapter 11, and are not 
depositions pursuant IR.CP. 30, Appellee's arguments as to the application of Rule 30 are 
mistaken and irrelevant to the Court's evaluation of this case and should be disregarded. None of 
the questions in the debtor's exam were made pursuant to Rule 30 as claimed by Appellee. 
Appellee's Motion for Order for Examination of Defendant (R., p. 32-34) specifically cites the 
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operative authority for the debtor's exam, "Comes now Sharon Wechsler, an individual (hereafter 
'Plaintiff) and pursuant to Idaho Code § 11-501 hereby moves the Court for an Order allowing the 
examination of the Defendant." The District Court stated the authority as well, "It is hereby ordered 
that Defendant Norman Wechsler shall appear for a Debtor's Examination, pursuant to Idaho Code 
11-502, before this Court at 2:00 p.m. on September 8th, 2015, and answer questions concerning 
assets owned by Defendant or obligations owed by a third party to Defendant." Order for Debtor's 
Exam (CR 32-34). Neither Appellee nor the court made any reference to IR.C.P. 30 until Appellee 
wanted to improperly employ the rules of discovery. Her own pleadings state the authority which 
she utilized to conduct the debtor's exam, and to allow her now to retroactively modify her 
pleadings to include IR. C.P. 3 0 and 69 would be a miscarriage of justice. Appellee' s claims that 
she conducted a Rule 30 deposition or conducted discovery pursuant to Rule 69 fail and the 
judgment of the District Court in this regard should be reversed and remanded with instruction. 
4. Appellee Failed to Meet and Confer Pursuant to IR.C.P. 37 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 3 7 requires that the movant in a motion to compel 
"include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the 
person or party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court 
action." Appellee's Motion contained no such certification. Motion to Compel Responses to 
Debtors Exam Questions (R., p. 64-66). In her Brief, Appellee incorrectly asserts that the debtor's 
examination fulfilled the requirement to meet and confer prior to filing a motion to compel. 
Respondent's Brief, p. 19. Appellee can hardly believe that the questions propounded and answers 
given in a debtor's exam suffice as an attempt to meet and confer prior to filing a motion to compel. 
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Appellee next argues that letters exchanged between the parties' attorneys were "valid meet 
and confer efforts." Respondent's Brief, p. 21. Appellee cites a letter from her counsel dated 
December 8, 2015, and from counsel for Appellant dated January 7, 2016. Counsel for Appellee 
closed his letter with the statement, "I look forward to receiving the requested information or 
access to the requested information as requested." R., p. 153. In his responding letter counsel for 
Appellant closed with the line "If you believe I misunderstood some aspect of your request and 
would like to discuss this further, I am always open to a new discussion." R., p. 155. Both parties 
appeared to believe that negotiations had not been completed regarding the provision of 
documents. Appellant was not provided notice or an opportunity to modify his position with the 
knowledge that Appellee planned to file a motion to compel, which is implied by the "good faith" 
statement in the rule. 
No valid, good faith meet and confer efforts took place prior to the filing of Appellee's 
Motion to Compel Responses to Debtors Exam Questions (CR 64-66), and even if they had, 
Appellee failed to comply with JR.C.P. 37's requirement that "the motion must include a 
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or 
party failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action." As a 
result, any remedy provided pursuant to the Motion to Compel was provided in error and the 
decision of the District Court should be reversed and remanded with instruction. 
5. Appellant Was Never Provided a Notice of Deposition 
Debtor's contention that he did not receive a notice of deposition before the debtor's 
examination is a fact. No notice of deposition is found in the record in this case and none was ever 
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provided. Appellee's contention that her Motion for Order for Examination of Defendant (CR 32-
34) was a notice of deposition is factually incorrect. As stated above, Appellee's Motion for Order 
for Examination of Defendant (CR 32-34) specifically cites the operative authority for the debtor's 
exam, "Comes now Sharon Wechsler, an individual (hereafter 'Plaintiff) and pursuant to Idaho 
Code §11-501 hereby moves the Court for an Order aliowing the examination of the Defendant." 
As a result, it cannot have put Appellant on notice that he was to attend a deposition. The District 
Court stated the authority as well, "It is hereby ordered that Defendant Norman Wechsler shall 
appear for a Debtor's Examination, pursuant to Idaho Code §11-502, before this Court at 2:00 p.m. 
on September 8th, 2015, and answer questions concerning assets owned by Defendant or 
obligations owed by a third party to Defendant." Order for Debtor's Exam (CR 32-34). A motion 
for a debtor's exam is wholly different from a Rule 30 deposition and Appellee chose a debtor's 
exam as the tool to obtain the information she wanted. A screwdriver does not become a wrench 
at the user's convenience, nor does Appellee's Motion (CR 32-34) become a Rule 30 notice of 
deposition at hers. 
6. Subpoenas 
The statement from Appellant 's Brief that "The authority to issue subpoenas is found in 
IR.C.P. 45, not in any of the rules which pertain to the discovery process," is true. Rule 45 is found 
in Title VJ, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Trial section of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Appellant's Brief, p. 8. The fact remains that Appellee herself gave Appellant notice of the 
consequence of not providing the subpoenaed documents. That consequence was stated clearly in 
her subpoena, "If you fail to appear at the place and time specified above, or to produce or permit 
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copying or inspection as specified above, you may be held in contempt of court and the aggrieved 
party may recover from you the sum of $100 and all damages which the party may sustain by your 
failure to comply with this subpoena." Subpoena Duces Tecum (CR 141-144). Appellee failed to 
obey her own rules and seeks to benefit from doing so. The District Court erred in allowing her to 
do so and its decision shouid be overturned and remanded with instruction. 
B. APPOINTMENT OF THE ANCILLARY RECEIVER WAS IMPROPER 
1. Authority Argument Was Raised in the Court Below 
Appellant provided argument that the District Court lacked authority to appoint an ancillary 
receiver in his Memorandum in Support of Response to Motion to Compel and Motion to Appoint 
Ancillary Receiver (CR 181-186) on one of the pages cited by Appellee in her Brief. Respondent's 
Brief, p. 22. He stated that "The right to appoint an ancillary receiver is not clear in any 
circumstance, and certainly not in the present one. Allowing the Creditor to violate Idaho law and 
the fiduciary duties of a shareholder, manager or director ( of even a few of the entities named) 
requires that the Creditor's motion be denied. Certainly Idaho cannot vest within any receiver more 
authority than that vested by the court in the original matter and, therefore, the Creditor's plan of 
action and her illegal intent is clear." Memorandum in Support of Response to Motion to Compel 
and Motion to Appoint Ancillary Receiver (CR 186). Appellant made this argument in his opening 
brief. Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 11-13. "For an objection to be preserved for appellate review, 
either the specific ground for the objection must be clearly stated or the basis of the objection must 
be apparent from the context." State v. Demint, 384 P.3d 995,997 (Idaho Ct. App. 2016). Appellant 
has objected on the basis of the District Court's lack of authority since the time of appointment. 
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The issue of authority to appoint an ancillary receiver was argued in the above cited pleading and 
in oral argument before the District Court. Appellee' s argument that because the issue was not 
briefed it has not been raised is not supported by law or fact. If Appellee' s argument were correct, 
oral objections in any district court would be of no avail, and any party who had not briefed an 
issue, even having raised a proper objection in the district court, wouid be prohibited from raising 
the objection on appeal. This position leads to an absurd result. Rule 46 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure states in pertinent part that "A formal exception to a ruling or order is unnecessary. 
When the ruling or order is requested or made, a party need only state the action that it wants the 
court to take or objects to, along with the grounds for the request or objection." Appellant raised 
the objection in argument before the District Court and in his pleadings. He stated grounds for his 
objection which were violation of Idaho law and a lack of authority of the District Court to take 
the action. It should also be noted that the shareholding and chart information supplied in 
Respondent's Brief are from 2010, and contain no current information. Appellant objected both in 
court and in his pleadings as required by Rule 46. The lack of authority has been pled and argued 
in this case, therefore it is not a new issue and this claim should survive. 
2. Code Does Not Address Appointment of Ancillary Receiver 
Appointment of an ancillary receiver is not permitted by any Idaho statute or rule. The 
District Court stated in its Order Appointing Ancillary Receiver (R., p. 206-210) that "courts of 
equity have been used to appoint Ancillary Receivers in the manner requested by the Plaintiff," 
yet the court failed to cite any case law or statutory authority for this statement. Even if the court 
somehow found that courts in other states had appointed an ancillary receiver, it is possible that a 
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statute or rule in that state permitted this type of appointment. This type of blanket statement 
lacking authority would be of no avail to an attorney advocating a case, therefore a district judge 
should not be held to a lower standard. Additional citation providing further refutation of the claim 
of the court is impossible as the court provided no basis for its statement. In its Order Appointing 
Ancillary Receiver, the court listed the sections of Idaho Code §8-601 it felt were relevant. The 
court failed to recognize that the statute does not authorize the appointment of an Ancillary 
Receiver at all. The reason that Ancillary Receivers are not mentioned is clear, if a receiver has 
been appointed, all authority has been allotted. In its analysis, the court found that the appointment 
of a receiver was a proceeding in the aid of execution that had been returned unsatisfied. The New 
York court made similar findings and appointed a receiver. The two receivers were appointed to 
manage the same "assets," and were given the same authority. As a result, Appellee, Appellant 
and the courts are forced to question which of court's rulings controls the case. The District Court 
failed to consider the absurd situation created by its hasty action. There was no legal foundation 
for the appointment of an Ancillary Receiver by the District Court. The decision should therefore 
be reversed and remanded with instruction. 
The appointment was also inappropriate because all rights and authority over CYB Master 
were appointed to JosephB. Nelson, CPA of the accounting firmofBerdon, LLP, New York, New 
York. Idaho Code §8-601(3) states that "A receiver may be appointed by the court in which an 
action is pending or has passed to judgment, or by the judge thereof: After judgment to carry the 
judgment into effect." A receiver, Joseph B. Nelson, CPA, was appointed by order of the Supreme 
Court ofNew York in May of2013 (CR 54-63). The order granted the receiver "all right, title and 
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authority heretofore vested in Norman Wechsler or the senior-most executive or control party, as 
applicable, of each of the Receivership Defendants, and the assets held by the Receivership 
Defendants to the fullest extent permitted by law." Order Appointing Receiver Pursuant to CPLR 
5228 (CR 54-63). No authority remained for the District Court to vest in an Ancillary Receiver, 
especially when Appellee is the party asking for the appointment. Had the New York receiver 
hired an Idaho attorney to domesticate the Order Appointing Receiver, he would then have had the 
proper tools to carry out his appointed duties in Idaho, including the ability to hire someone to act 
for him here. Appellee chose a path easiest for her rather than a legally correct one. Rewarding 
this type of legal acrobatics would set an unfortunate precedent which the lower courts would be 
tasked with interpreting. 
Following the District Court's erroneous appointment of the Ancillary Receiver, Appellee 
then submitted a Writ of Assistance containing inappropriate and unreasonable language which the 
District Court chose to sign. Appellee immediately executed the Writ without notice of any kind 
to Appellant or his counsel. Appellee has never stated a single reason for such expeditious action. 
The reason may be that she was aware of the impropriety of her case and pleadings, and soughfto 
obtain what she wanted before the erroneous rulings were corrected. The relief requested by 
Appellee, and which the District Court erred in granting, was illegal for the court to grant as no 
authority remained for the court to distribute. Appellee could have taken action to compel the New 
York receiver to act in his appointed capacity if she felt his services were inadequate. She could 
also have moved the New York court to remove him and appoint an alternate receiver. She failed 
to do so, and petitioned the District Court for relief it had no authority to grant. The District Court 
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erred in appointing an Ancillary Receiver as there is no statutory or case law grant of authority to 
do so, and because the authority Appellee sought for an Ancillary Receiver had already been 
granted to another. 
On page 29 of her Brief, Appellee provides further evidence that the Ancillary Receiver's 
• ,...l ,..:J O + 1 ('11.. 0 .L T J _ J f'f 1 f' n / A -' , .. appomtment v,ras not conuucteu appropnaleiy . .:me CiteS 1uano 1._,oae J(5-0UL/- to support her 
argument. The quoted portion states, "Before entering upon his duties the receiver must be sworn 
to perform them faithfully, and with one (1) or more sureties, approved by the court or judge, 
execute an undertaking, to such person and in such sum as the court or judge may direct .... " 
Idaho Code §8-604 (Michie 2016). The Ancillary Receiver was never sworn, either orally or in 
writing, to perform his duties faithfully. As a result, he is not qualified to perform those duties. 
This is yet another short cut that Appellee chose to take, and that the District Court permitted. 
Appellee was forced to use non-binding, non-persuasive holdings from New York state 
court and the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals to support her position in this regard as there is no Idaho 
case law that does so. In fact, a Lexis Advance search for the term ancillary receiver in Idaho yields 
no results. The order of the District Court appointing the Ancillary Receiver should be reversed 
and remanded with orders that Appellee must abide by Idaho law and the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure as they relate to this case. 
3. False Claim by Appellee 
On page 27, paragraph 3, of her Brief; Appellee falsely claims that "Debtor has access to bank 
accounts that are part of the Receivership Estate." Appellee provided no citation, proof or evidence 
for this claim. Appellee has already seized funds from the accounts to which Appellant has access, 
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including exempt funds which the District C ordered her to return. She provides no foundation for 
this claim and Appellant requests that the Court disregard it. 
C. APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED 
1. Constitutional Issues Were Raised in the Court Below 
Appeiiee acknowledges in her Briefthat Appellant raised the violations of his First, Fourth, 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in the court below. Respondent's Brief, p. 30. However, 
Appellee is incorrect in her statement that the "the district court did not consider or decide any 
constitutional issues." The District Court decided to ignore every constitutional issue that has been 
appealed. This fact is most simply illustrated by Appellant's pleading cited by Appellee. In his 
Objection and Response to Plaintiff's Proposed Order Appointing Ancillary Receiver, R., p. 212, 
Appellant alleged violations of the above mentioned rights by stating "Debtor believes the Order 
proposed is not consistent with due process, the preservation of fundamental rights under the First, 
Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Court's Decision filed May 11, 2016." The 
District Court ignored the filing, as did Appellee. She now wishes to benefit from her own inaction, 
as well as that of the District Court. The violations of Appellant's First, Fourth, Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights were raised below, and Appellant requests that they be considered 
by this Court, that the Court find that his rights were violated, and that the Court reverse the 
decisions of the District Court and remand the case with instructions. 
2. This Court Can Consider Constitutional Issues Raised on Appeal 
This Court has held that "Constitutional issues may be considered for the first time on 
appeal if such consideration is necessary for subsequent proceedings in the case." Sanchez v. 
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Arave, 120 Idaho 321, 322, 815 P.2d 1061, 1062 (1991), citing Messmer v. Ker, 96 Idaho 75, 78, 
524 P.2d 536,539 (1974). Idaho Code §1-205 states that "the court may reverse, affirm or modify 
any order or judgment appealed from, and may direct the proper judgment or order to be entered, 
or direct a new trial or further proceedings to be had." Appellant requested in his Opening Brief 
"that this Court reverse the orders of the District Court and remand for further proceedings with 
orders for the court to act in accordance with the reversal." Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 36. 
Appellee acknowledged this in her Brief "See Murray v. Spalding, 141 Idaho 99, 101-02, 106 
P.3d 425, 427-28 (2005) (holding that appellate court will not consider issues raised for the first 
time on appeal, but also noting exception that 'constitutional issues may be considered for the first 
time on appeal if such consideration is necessary for subsequent proceedings in the case.')" 
Respondent's Brief, p. 30. Appellee's purpose in District Court is the collection of money 
judgments. This Court is involved in that process only to the extent that it has been asked to rule 
upon certain decisions of the District Court which have governed that process. As a result, when 
the issues presented to the Idaho Supreme Court have been decided, collection proceedings will, 
presumably, continue in the District Court pursuant to guidance given in this Court's ruling. 
Appellee is incorrect in her assertion that "there are no subsequent proceedings in this case." 
Respondent's Brief, p. 30. Pleadings were filed in the District Court February 17, 2017 by Appellee 
which will require additional proceedings. Because proceedings are ongoing in the District Court, 
consideration of the constitutional issues raised here is necessary. This case fits the requirements 
of Idaho Code §1-205, and the Messmer case as there will be subsequent proceedings, and it is 
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necessary that the constitutional issues alleged be decided by this Court as further violations of 
Appellant's rights are likely to take place in subsequent proceedings if action is not taken. 
3. Appellant's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights Apply 
Both the District Court and Appellee have frequently acknowledged that the Ancillary 
Receiver is an agent of the court. In her Brief, Appeilee stated that "lhe court appointed the 
Ancillary Receiver as its 'arm,' to assist in the locating, seizing and documenting the property, 
materials, computer files, and information in Debtor's possession in his home in Pocatello, Idaho 
as they relate to CYB Master LLC." Respondent's Brief, p. 28. As such, he is not a "private party" 
as alleged, and both requirements of the two part test constructed by the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals are met. See United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1982). 
The first prong of the two part test is whether the government knew of and acquiesced in 
the intrusive conduct. United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1982). Because the 
action was government mandated this prong is met. Additionally, the presence of two Bannock 
County Sheriff's deputies, as well as the Ancillary Receiver, an appointed arm of the government, 
demonstrate that the government knew and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct. 
The second prong of the test has not been properly analyzed by Appellee. This prong asks 
whether the private party intended to assist law enforcement efforts or further his own ends. United 
States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1982). The fault in Appellee's analysis is that no 
private party was present, or acting for his own gain. Only government officials went to 
Appellant's home to conduct a search and seizure of his property and effects. These officials were 
two Bannock County Sheriff's deputies, and the Ancillary Receiver. Their purpose was to conduct 
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the business of the District Court, not to further their own ends. Mr. Smith was not there to recover 
something for himself, he was there at the direction of the court, with sheriff's deputies, to conduct 
a search and seize property. Following the search he was to report to the District Court as to his 
findings, not to Appellee. Any action taken by him was directed by the court. He was and is an 
agent of the court, and therefore, of the government. As noted above, Appellee described the 
Ancillary Receiver as an arm of the court. An arm cannot act on its own, it must be part of a body. 
In this case, a body of government. The District Court itself stated the responsibility of the 
Ancillary Receiver, "The Ancillary Receiver is hereby appointed an officer of the Court and 
granted all of the powers authorized pursuant to Idaho Code §8-605, namely, the power, under the 
control of the Court, to bring and defend actions in his own name, as receiver; to take and keep 
possession of the property, to receive rents, collect debts, to compound for and compromise the 
same, to make transfers, and generally to do such acts respecting the property as the court may 
authorize." R., p. 208 (Emphasis added). Both prongs of the Miller test are met in this case. As a 
result, Mr. Wechsler's Fourth Amendment protections apply, and should be enforced by a reversal 
of the District Court's decisions, and a remand with instructions. 
The bankruptcy precedents cited by Appellee in this section of her Brief are neither binding 
nor persuasive for this Court pursuant to 28 USC §151. In re Kerlo, 311 B.R. 256,263 (Bankr. 
C.D. Cal. 2004), is a California bankruptcy case and was not issued in the District ofldaho. The 
same is true for In re Bodeker, No. 12-60137-7, 2013 Bankr. LEXIS 2336, at *46 (U.S. Bankr. D. 
Mont. June 7, 2013), a case from the Montana bankruptcy court. Appellee chose to rely on this 
obscure California bankruptcy case because it serves her purposes, but supplies no binding or 
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persuasive authority to support her contentions. Both cases are distinguishable from this case as 
bankruptcy cases require the debtor to complete "bankruptcy schedules," which are required, 
detailed forms that must be completed prior to the filing of a bankruptcy, and because the rules 
which pertain to bankruptcy cases do not apply to collection cases. Appellant has at all times done 
his best to maintain his privacy in his home and effects. Despite Appellee's constant desire to 
compare this case to a bankruptcy case, they are not the same. This is a debt collection case in 
which the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the U.S. and Idaho Constitutions apply, and must 
be followed by all litigants. 
Appellant had and has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his home, papers, and effects. 
As stated by Appellee in her Brief, the four prongs of that test are: (1) whether the person has a 
proprietary or possessory interest in the place searched or property to be seized, (2) whether the 
person has the right to exclude others from the premises, (3) whether the person has taken normal 
precautions to maintain his or her privacy, and (4) whether the person is legitimately on the 
premises. Mr. Wechsler owns his home, and it is exempt from seizure pursuant to Idaho Code 
§§55-1003, 1008. He has both a proprietary and possessory interest therein. He has a right to, and 
has, excluded others from the premises. He has taken normal precautions to protect and maintain 
his privacy in that there are locks on all doors leading into the home and blinds on the windows. 
He also required that the government agents who came to his home to seize property and 
information, the Ancillary Receiver and two sheriffs deputies, provide a warrant prior to entering 
his home. As the owner of the home, he is legitimately on the premises. All four prongs of the test 
outlined by Appellee are met. 
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Appellee's Kerlo expectation of privacy analysis is also faulty. Appellee quotes Kerlo to 
say that "a debtor has a 'significantly reduced expectation of privacy in their houses, papers, and 
effects' because of the requirement of substantial and detailed disclosures in a bankruptcy 
proceeding." This case is not a bankruptcy proceeding and Appellant has not been required to 
provide comparabie forms or information. AppeHant answered questions in the debtor's exam. The 
fact that Appellee was not pleased with the answers does not invalidate Appellant's Fourth 
Amendment protections. The two are in no way related. Appellant has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his home and effects. Appellant's Fourth Amendment protections apply and should be 
enforced through a reversal of the District Court's orders and a remand with instructions. 
4. Appellant's Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Rights to Due Process Were Violated 
Appellant was deprived of due process in this case because Appellee, and the District 
Court, failed once again to abide by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, IR. C.P. 
2.3 (b) provides that "Immediately after entering an order or judgment, the clerk of the district 
court, or magistrates division, must serve a copy of it on every party, with the clerk's filing stamp 
showing the date of filing." The District Court has complied with this rule in every step of the 
proceedings by emailing out its orders to both parties. However, the court failed to do so when it 
signed the Writ of Assistance. See R., 6/15/2016 p. 5. Prior notice would also have offered an 
additional opportunity for the parties to have an additional discussion regarding the desired 
materials. 
In this section of her Brief Appellee again cites cases which are from obscure non-binding, 
non-persuasive California and Florida sources. She also asserts that this case is the same as every 
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other debt collection case. This position is incorrect. Appellee first obtained a writ of garnishment 
on March 17, 2015, which she then executed. R., 3/17/2015 p. 2. To say now that assets or 
information would have been hidden or destroyed had she given proper notice of her application 
for a writ of assistance, which did not ask that the writ be granted ex parte, is disingenuous at best 
as more than a year had passed since execution of her writ of garnishment. 
Both cases cited by Appellee in her argument are garnishment cases and not cases where 
writs of assistance were issued and are therefore distinguishable. Garnishment has already 
happened in this case and, in equating a writ of garnishment and a writ of assistance, Appellee has 
made the same error as the District Court. The two are different because of the liquidity of money 
and the importance of the rights violated. Appellee seeks possession of property and information. 
She has already obtained possession of all existent funds to which she has a right. The government 
and its representatives now wish to search Appellant's home and remove any property or thing of 
value. R., p. 208. Prior to this kind of intrusion upon his home and seizure of his property the Fifth 
Amendment demands that he be afforded due process. In Fuentes v. Shevin, the U.S. Supreme 
Court vacated the decisions of United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in 
various cases where writs of replevin had been issued. That court held that "Since the essential 
reason for the requirement of a prior hearing is to prevent unfair and mistaken deprivations of 
property, however, it is axiomatic that the hearing must provide a real test." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 
U.S. 67, 97 (1972). In this case, there was no test at all. The District Court issued the Writ without 
a hearing or notice, and government officials then proceeded with execution. While it is true that 
statutory law was being evaluated in Fuentes, the effect of the District Court's decision is the same 
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as that of the Florida statute in question. Additionally, government agents were those seizing 
property in both cases. "Due process is afforded only by the kinds of 'notice' and 'hearing' that are 
aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the probable validity, of the underlying claim against 
the alleged debtor before he can be deprived of his property." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 97 
( 1972). Appeiiant was afforded no such hearing prior to the issuing of the Writ of Assistance. He 
was deprived of due process by the District Court at Appellee's insistence. Appellant requests that 
this Court reverse the decisions of the District Court and remand for further proceedings with 
instructions. 
5. Appellant's First and Fourteenth Amendment Rights Were Violated 
Appellant relies on his First Amendment argument contained in Appellant's Brief to supply 
argument to the general points offered on this subject by Appellee in her Brief However, it must 
be pointed out that she alleges that Appellant can "seek a protective order to protect non-relevant 
information that goes to his political and personal opinions." Once again Appellee incorrectly 
asserts that the discovery process has been employed in this case. The requirements for a protective 
order such as Appellee advocates are found in Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c). The first line 
of that section states, "A party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a 
protective order in the court where the action is pending, or as an alternative on matters relating to 
a deposition, in the court where the deposition will be taken." (Emphasis added). No discovery 
request has ever been propounded by Appellee in this case. Because discovery must be sought in 
order to obtain a protective order, a mandatory prerequisite is absent, therefore Appellee is 
incorrect in all of her assertions that Appellant could have obtained a protective order to protect 
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his political and personal speech as well as privileged information. The remedies available to a 
party seeking a protective order (IR.C.P. 26(c)(l)(A-H)) all pertain to discovery devices as well. 
Appellee also argues that Appellant's First Amendment rights are somehow diminished 
because he seeks to protect them. She has offered no case or statutory law supporting her 
contention. She states that if Appellant «had complied with his duties and court orders, he could 
have easily retained privileged information." At the same time she states that Appellant's First 
Amendment rights are diminished at this point so she can obtain whatever records she desires. The 
likelihood that she would have simply allowed the retention of any record seems negligible at best. 
This position is similar to a sheriffs deputy with no warrant telling a citizen, just let us search, if 
you have nothing to hide what's the problem. The problem is that that individual would be giving 
up constitutional rights which should be protected. Appellant is not hiding, nor is he hiding 
information, behind his First Amendment rights. He simply seeks to protect them. He asks that 
this Court do so as well by overturning the rulings of the lower court and remanding the case with 
instructions. 
6. District Court Should Have Granted Attorney Fees 
Appellant refers the Court to Section B above for a refutation of Appellee's assertions in 
this regard, as well as to Section D of Appellant's Brief 
7. Motions to Strike Were Improperly Denied by the District Court 
Appellant refers the Court to Section B above for a refutation of Appellee's assertions in 
this regard, as well as to Section F of Appellant's Brief 
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8. A Conflict of Interest Exists in an Officer of the Court Being Compensated by Appellee, 
and Being Represented by Her Counsel 
Language contained in Appellee' s brief itself demonstrates the presence of the very conflict 
she seeks to camouflage. She states that "On June 20, 2016 Plaintiff filed her Motion for Contempt 
and an Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time, Augmented R., 16.06.20 Motion for Contempt, Ex Parte 
Motion to Shorten Time. In the caption of those documents it reads that they identify counsel for 
Creditor to also be counsel for Ancillary Receiver, David M. Smith. Id. In the body of the Motion 
for Contempt, as well as the Ex Parte Motion to Shorten Time, it also states that the Ancillary 
Receiver is represented by counsel for Plaintiff. These pleadings misidentify Creditor's counsel's 
role in this matter as they relate to the Ancillary Receiver." David Alexander has been licensed to 
practice law in Idaho for 25 years, and Steve Muhonen for 14. Appellee attempts in her Brief to 
represent that these experienced and seasoned attorneys created pleadings for someone they did 
not represent. It is more likely that Appellee felt that the Receiver was her employee and that, 
because he was unable to obtain the information she wanted, her attorneys could represent him. 
This scenario explains the filing of the Motion for Contempt on behalf of the Ancillary Receiver 
in a more believable way. The Ancillary Receiver is identified as their client, not just once, but 
multiple times in two different pleadings. 
Appellee also stated that "The ancillary receiver alleged the Debtor refused to c~operate 
with the Ancillary Receiver through his alleged refusal to provide documentation, materials and 
other objects to the Ancillary Receiver on June 16, 2016." Appellant was never contacted by the 
Ancillary Receiver regarding the Motion for Contempt until it was submitted. The logical inference 
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is that he was communicating with Appellee and her counsel on an ex parte basis. The District 
Court acknowledged in its Decision Re: Conflict of Interest that it had not been contacted by the 
Ancillary Receiver regarding the contempt prior to the Motion being filed. Decision Re: Conflict 
of Interest, Oct. 3, 2016, p. 5. The court also noted that "there appears to be a concern regarding 
comnrnnication with the receiver. As a general and basic ruie, no ex parte communication should 
be occurring with the receiver. However, in this case, the whole basis for appointing a receiver is 
that Defendant is not complying with multiple inter-state court orders regarding valid judgments 
against him. As it stands, further sheltering of assets may have already occurred as a result of such 
proceedings, including the failed attempt to carry out the Court's order, so some measure of 
discretion of communication is not completely without basis. That being said, so as to avoid any 
confusion or allegations in the future, the Court would recommend that all communications with 
the receiver by counsel or parties be made with full knowledge of opposing counsel or parties 
either in person or via electronic means." Decision Re: Conflict of Interest, Oct. 3, 2016, p. 5. The 
Court acknowledged that there had been ex parte communication, and failed to take action to stop 
it by merely recommending that communications be shared by all. 
A conflict existed and was ignored by the District Court because of its desire to punish Mr. 
Wechsler. Appellant requests that the Court reverse this decision and remand the case with 
instructions that the lower court comply. 
9. Attorney Fees on Appeal 
Appellant moves the Court to award all attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of this 
appeal pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41 and Idaho Code 12-121. As demonstrated above, and 
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in Appellant's Brief, the issues appealed are based on Idaho statutory and case law as well as the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Most importantly, the errors of the District Court in its conduct of 
this case below necessitate appeal, and merit an award of attorney fees to Appellant upon this 
Court's favorable ruling and decision. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The court below made many errors in its handling of this case. Among them, it improperly 
compelled Appellant to remit property and information pursuant to discovery rules which did not 
apply, it appointed an Ancillary Receiver without statutory or case law authority, and signed 
orders, decisions and a Writ which violated Appellants First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. The majority of these decisions appear to result from a catastrophic 
misunderstanding and misapplication of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, Idaho Code and case 
law by Appellee and the District Court. Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
orders of the District Court and remand for further proceedings with instructions for the court to 
act in accordance with the reversal. 
DATED this 21st day of February, 2017. 
MAY, RAMMELL & THOMPSON, CHTD 
Attorneys for. 'Pellant \ ) 
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